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Abstract—Attribute-based access control (ABAC) provides a high level
of flexibility that promotes security and information sharing. ABAC policy
mining algorithms have potential to significantly reduce the cost of
migration to ABAC, by partially automating the development of an ABAC
policy from an access control list (ACL) policy or role-based access
control (RBAC) policy with accompanying attribute data. This paper
presents an ABAC policy mining algorithm. To the best of our knowl-
edge, it is the first ABAC policy mining algorithm. Our algorithm iterates
over tuples in the given user-permission relation, uses selected tuples
as seeds for constructing candidate rules, and attempts to generalize
each candidate rule to cover additional tuples in the user-permission
relation by replacing conjuncts in attribute expressions with constraints.
Our algorithm attempts to improve the policy by merging and simplifying
candidate rules, and then it selects the highest-quality candidate rules
for inclusion in the generated policy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) provides a high
level of flexibility that promotes security and information
sharing [1]. ABAC also overcomes some of the problems
associated with RBAC [2], notably role explosion [1], [3].
The benefits of ABAC led the Federal Chief Information
Officer Council to call out ABAC as a recommended
access control model in the Federal Identity Credential
and Access Management Roadmap and Implementation
Guidance, ver. 2.0 [1], [4].
Manual development of RBAC policies can be time-
consuming and expensive [5]. Role mining algorithms
promise to drastically reduce the cost, by partially au-
tomating the development of RBAC policies [5]. Role
mining is an active research area and a currently rel-
atively small (about $70 million) but rapidly growing
commercial market segment [5]. Similarly, manual devel-
opment of ABAC policies can be difficult [6] and expen-
sive [1]. ABAC policy mining algorithms have potential
to reduce the cost of ABAC policy development.
The main contribution of this paper is an algorithm
for ABAC policy mining. Our algorithm is formulated
to mine an ABAC policy from ACLs and attribute data.
It can be used to mine an ABAC policy from an RBAC
policy and attribute data, by expanding the RBAC policy
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into ACLs, adding a “role” attribute to the attribute
data (to avoid information loss), and then applying
our algorithm. At a high level, our algorithm works
as follows. It iterates over tuples in the given user-
permission relation, uses selected tuples as seeds for
constructing candidate rules, and attempts to general-
ize each candidate rule to cover additional tuples in
the user-permission relation by replacing conjuncts in
attribute expressions with constraints. After construct-
ing candidate rules that together cover the entire user-
permission relation, it attempts to improve the policy
by merging and simplifying candidate rules. Finally, it
selects the highest-quality candidate rules for inclusion
in the generated policy. We also developed an extension
of the algorithm to identify suspected noise in the input.
Section 5 presents results from evaluating the algo-
rithm on some relatively small but non-trivial hand-
written sample policies and on synthetic (i.e., pseudo-
randomly generated) policies. The general methodology
is to start with an ABAC policy (including attribute
data), generate an equivalent ACL policy from the ABAC
policy, add noise (in some experiments) to the ACL
policy and attribute data, run our algorithm on the
resulting ACL policies and attribute data, and compare
the mined ABAC policy with the original ABAC policy.
2 ABAC POLICY LANGUAGE
This section presents our ABAC policy language. We do
not consider policy administration, since our goal is to
mine a single ABAC policy from the current low-level
policy. We present a specific concrete policy language,
rather than a flexible framework, to simplify the expo-
sition and evaluation of our policy mining algorithm,
although our approach is general and can be adapted
to other ABAC policy languages. Our ABAC policy lan-
guage contains all of the common ABAC policy language
constructs, except arithmetic inequalities and negation.
Extending our algorithm to handle those constructs is
future work. The policy language handled in this pa-
per is already significantly more complex than policy
languages handled in previous work on security policy
mining.
ABAC policies refer to attributes of users and re-
sources. Given a set U of users and a set Au of user
attributes, user attribute data is represented by a function
du such that du(u, a) is the value of attribute a for user
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2u. There is a distinguished user attribute uid that has a
unique value for each user. Similarly, given a set R of
resources and a set Ar of resource attributes, resource
attribute data is represented by a function dr such that
dr(r, a) is the value of attribute a for resource r. There is
a distinguished resource attribute rid that has a unique
value for each resource. We assume the set Au of user
attributes can be partitioned into a set Au,1 of single-
valued user attributes which have atomic values, and a
set Au,m of multi-valued user attributes whose values are
sets of atomic values. Similarly, we assume the set Ar of
resource attributes can be partitioned into a set Ar,1 of
single-valued resource attributes and a set of Ar,m of multi-
valued resource attributes. Let Vals be the set of possible
atomic values of attributes. We assume Vals includes a
distinguished value ⊥ used to indicate that an attribute’s
value is unknown. The set of possible values of multi-
valued attributes is Valm = Set(Vals \ {⊥}) ∪ ⊥, where
Set(S) is the powerset of set S.
Attribute expressions are used to express the sets of
users and resources to which a rule applies. A user-
attribute expression (UAE) is a function e such that, for
each user attribute a, e(a) is either the special value
>, indicating that e imposes no constraint on the value
of attribute a, or a set (interpreted as a disjunction) of
possible values of a excluding ⊥ (in other words, a
subset of Vals\{⊥} or Valm\{⊥}, depending on whether
a is single-valued or multi-valued). We refer to the set
e(a) as the conjunct for attribute a. We say that expression
e uses an attribute a if e(a) 6= >. Let attr(e) denote the set
of attributes used by e. Let attr1(e) and attrm(e) denote
the sets of single-valued and multi-valued attributes,
respectively, used by e.
A user u satisfies a user-attribute expression e, denoted
u |= e, iff (∀a ∈ Au,1. e(a) = > ∨ ∃v ∈ e(a). du(u, a) = v)
and (∀a ∈ Au,m. e(a) = > ∨ ∃v ∈ e(a). du(u, a) ⊇ v). For
multi-valued attributes, we use the condition du(u, a) ⊇
v instead of du(u, a) = v because elements of a multi-
valued user attribute typically represent some type of
capabilities of a user, so using ⊇ expresses that the user
has the specified capabilities and possibly more.
For example, suppose Au,1 = {dept,position} and
Au,m = {courses}. The function e1 with e1(dept) = {CS}
and e1(position) = {grad,ugrad} and e1(courses) =
{{CS101,CS102}} is a user-attribute expression satisfied
by users in the CS department who are either graduate
or undergraduate students and whose courses include
CS101 and CS102 (and possibly other courses).
We introduce a concrete syntax for attribute expres-
sions, for improved readability in examples. We write
a user attribute expression as a conjunction of the con-
juncts not equal to >. Suppose e(a) 6= >. Let v = e(a).
When a is single-valued, we write the conjunct for a as
a ∈ v; as syntactic sugar, if v is a singleton set {s}, we
may write the conjunct as a = s. When a is multi-valued,
we write the conjunct for a as a ⊇∈ v (indicating that
a is a superset of an element of v); as syntactic sugar,
if v is a singleton set {s}, we may write the conjunct
as a ⊇ s. For example, the above expression e1 may
be written as dept = CS ∧ position ∈ {ugrad, grad} ∧
courses ⊇ {CS101,CS102}. For an example that uses
⊇∈, the expression e2 that is the same as e1 except
with e2(courses) = {{CS101}, {CS102}} may be written
as dept = CS ∧ position ∈ {ugrad, grad} ∧ courses ⊇∈
{{CS101}, {CS102}}, and is satisfied by graduate or
undergraduate students in the CS department whose
courses include either CS101 or CS102.
The meaning of a user-attribute expression e, denoted
[[e]]U , is the set of users in U that satisfy it: [[e]]U = {u ∈
U | u |= e}. User attribute data is an implicit argument
to [[e]]U . We say that e characterizes the set [[e]]U .
A resource-attribute expression (RAE) is defined sim-
ilarly, except using the set Ar of resource attributes
instead of the set Au of user attributes. The semantics
of RAEs is defined similarly to the semantics of UAEs,
except simply using equality, not ⊇, in the condition for
multi-valued attributes in the definition of “satisfies”,
because we do not interpret elements of multi-valued
resource attributes specially (e.g., as capabilities).
In ABAC policy rules, constraints are used to express
relationships between users and resources. An atomic
constraint is a formula f of the form au,m ⊇ ar,m,
au,m 3 ar,1, or au,1 = ar,1, where au,1 ∈ Au,1, au,m ∈ Au,m,
ar,1 ∈ Ar,1, and ar,m ∈ Ar,m. The first two forms express
that user attributes contain specified values. This is a
common type of constraint, because user attributes typi-
cally represent some type of capabilities of a user. Other
forms of atomic constraint are possible (e.g., au,m ⊆ ar,m)
but less common, so we leave them for future work.
Let uAttr(f) and rAttr(f) refer to the user attribute
and resource attribute, respectively, used in f . User u
and resource r satisfy an atomic constraint f , denoted
〈u, r〉 |= f , if du(u,uAttr(f)) 6= ⊥ and dr(u, rAttr(f)) 6= ⊥
and formula f holds when the values du(u,uAttr(f)) and
dr(u, rAttr(f)) are substituted in it.
A constraint is a set (interpreted as a conjunction)
of atomic constraints. User u and resource r satisfy a
constraint c, denoted 〈u, r〉 |= c, if they satisfy every
atomic constraint in c. In examples, we write constraints
as conjunctions instead of sets. For example, the con-
straint “specialties ⊇ topics ∧ teams 3 treatingTeam” is
satisfied by user u and resource r if the user’s specialties
include all of the topics associated with the resource, and
the set of teams associated with the user contains the
treatingTeam associated with the resource.
A user-permission tuple is a tuple 〈u, r, o〉 containing a
user, a resource, and an operation. This tuple means that
user u has permission to perform operation o on resource
r. A user-permission relation is a set of such tuples.
A rule is a tuple 〈eu, er, O, c〉, where eu is a user-
attribute expression, er is a resource-attribute expression,
O is a set of operations, and c is a constraint. For a
rule ρ = 〈eu, er, O, c〉, let uae(ρ) = eu, rae(ρ) = er,
ops(ρ) = O, and con(ρ) = c. For example, the rule 〈true,
type=task ∧ proprietary=false, {read, request}, projects
3 project ∧ expertise ⊇ expertise〉 used in our project
3management case study can be interpreted as “A user
working on a project can read and request to work on a
non-proprietary task whose required areas of expertise
are among his/her areas of expertise.” User u, resource
r, and operation o satisfy a rule ρ, denoted 〈u, r, o〉 |= ρ,
if u |= uae(ρ) ∧ r |= rae(ρ) ∧ o ∈ ops(ρ) ∧ 〈u, r〉 |= con(ρ).
An ABAC policy is a tuple
〈U,R,Op, Au, Ar, du, dr,Rules〉, where U , R, Au, Ar,
du, and dr are as described above, Op is a set of
operations, and Rules is a set of rules.
The user-permission relation induced by a rule ρ is
[[ρ]] = {〈u, r, o〉 ∈ U ×R×Op | 〈u, r, o〉 |= ρ}. Note that U ,
R, du, and dr are implicit arguments to [[ρ]].
The user-permission relation induced by a policy pi
with the above form is [[pi]] =
⋃
ρ∈Rules [[ρ]].
3 THE ABAC POLICY MINING PROBLEM
An access control list (ACL) policy is a tuple
〈U,R,Op,UP0〉, where U is a set of users, R is
a set of resources, Op is a set of operations, and
UP0 ⊆ U × R × Op is a user-permission relation,
obtained from the union of the access control lists.
An ABAC policy pi is consistent with an ACL policy
〈U,P,Op,UP0〉 if they have the same sets of users,
resource, and operations and [[pi]] = UP0.
An ABAC policy consistent with a given ACL policy
can be trivially constructed, by creating a separate rule
corresponding to each user-permission tuple in the ACL
policy, simply using uid and rid to identify the relevant
user and resource. Of course, such an ABAC policy is
as verbose and hard to manage as the original ACL
policy. This observation forces us to ask: among ABAC
policies semantically consistent with a given ACL policy
pi0, which ones are preferable? We adopt two criteria.
One criterion is that policies that do not use the
attributes uid and rid are preferable, because policies that
use uid and rid are partly identity-based, not entirely
attribute-based. Therefore, our definition of ABAC policy
mining requires that these attributes are used only if
necessary, i.e., only if every ABAC policy semantically
consistent with pi0 contains rules that use them.
The other criterion is to maximize a policy quality
metric. A policy quality metric is a function Qpol from
ABAC policies to a totally-ordered set, such as the
natural numbers. The ordering is chosen so that small
values indicate high quality; this is natural for metrics
based on policy size. For generality, we parameterize the
policy mining problem by the policy quality metric.
The ABAC policy mining problem is: given an ACL
policy pi0 = 〈U,R,Op,UP0〉, user attributes Au, re-
source attributes Ar, user attribute data du, resource
attribute data dr, and a policy quality metric Qpol, find
a set Rules of rules such that the ABAC policy pi =
〈U,R,Op, Au, Ar, du, dr,Rules〉 that (1) is consistent with
pi0, (2) uses uid only when necessary, (3) uses rid only
when necessary, and (4) has the best quality, according
to Qpol, among such policies.
The policy quality metric that our algorithm aims
to optimize is weighted structural complexity (WSC) [7],
a generalization of policy size. This is consistent with
usability studies of access control rules, which conclude
that more concise policies are more manageable [6].
Informally, the WSC of an ABAC policy is a weighted
sum of the number of elements in the policy. Formally,
the WSC of an ABAC policy pi with rules Rules is
WSC(pi) = WSC(Rules), defined by
WSC(e) =
∑
a∈attr1(e)
|e(a)|+
∑
a∈attrm(e),s∈e(a)
|s|
WSC(〈eu, er, O, c〉) = w1WSC(eu) + w2WSC(er)
+ w3|O|+ w4|c|
WSC(Rules) =
∑
ρ∈Rules
WSC(ρ),
where |s| is the cardinality of set s, and the wi are user-
specified weights.
Computational Complexity: We show that the
ABAC policy mining problem is NP-hard, by reducing
the Edge Role Mining Problem (Edge RMP) [8] to it.
NP-hardness of Edge RMP follows from Theorem 1 in
[7]. The basic idea of the reduction is that an Edge
RMP instance IR is translated into an ABAC policy
mining problem instance IA with uid and rid as the only
attributes. Given a solution piABAC to problem instance
IA, the solution to IR is constructed by interpreting each
rule as a role. Details of the reduction appear in Section
8 in the Supplemental Material.
It is easy to show that a decision-problem version
of ABAC policy mining is in NP. The decision-problem
version asks whether there exists an ABAC policy that
meets conditions (1)–(3) in the above definition of the
ABAC policy mining problem and has WSC less than or
equal to a given value.
4 POLICY MINING ALGORITHM
Top-level pseudocode for our policy mining algorithm
appears in Figure 1. It reflects the high-level structure
described in Section 1. Functions called by the top-level
pseudocode are described next. Function names hyper-
link to pseudocode for the function, if it is included in
the paper, otherwise to a description of the function. An
example illustrating the processing of a user-permission
tuple by our algorithm appears in Section 13 in the
Supplemental Material. For efficiency, our algorithm in-
corporates heuristics and is not guaranteed to generate
a policy with minimal WSC.
The function addCandidateRule(su, sr, so, cc, uncovUP ,
Rules) in Figure 2 first calls computeUAE to com-
pute a user-attribute expression eu that characterizes
su, then calls and computeRAE to compute a resource-
attribute expression er that characterizes sr. It then
calls generalizeRule(ρ, cc, uncovUP ,Rules) to generalize
the rule ρ = 〈eu, er, so, ∅〉 to ρ′ and adds ρ′ to candidate
rule set Rules . The details of the functions called by
addCandidateRule are described next.
4The function computeUAE(s, U) computes a user-
attribute expression eu that characterizes the set s of
users. The conjunct for each attribute a contains the
values of a for users in s, unless one of those values
is ⊥, in which case a is unused (i.e., the conjunct for
a is >). Furthermore, the conjunct for uid is removed if
the resulting attribute expression still characterizes s; this
step is useful because policies that are not identity-based
generalize better. Similarly, computeRAE(s,R) computes
a resource-attribute expression that characterizes the set
s of resources. The attribute expressions returned by
computeUAE and computeRAE might not be minimum-
sized among expressions that characterize s: it is possible
that some conjuncts can be removed. We defer mini-
mization of the attribute expressions until after the call
to generalizeRule (described below), because minimizing
them before that would reduce opportunities to find
relations between values of user attributes and resource
attributes in generalizeRule.
The function candidateConstraint(r, u) returns a
set containing all the atomic constraints that hold
between resource r and user u. Pseudocode for
candidateConstraint is straightforward and omitted.
A rule ρ′ is valid if [[ρ′]] ⊆ UP0.
The function generalizeRule(ρ, cc, uncovUP ,Rules) in
Figure 3 attempts to generalize rule ρ by adding some
of the atomic constraints f in cc to ρ and eliminating
the conjuncts of the user attribute expression and the
resource attribute expression corresponding to the at-
tributes used in f , i.e., mapping those attributes to >.
If the resulting rule is invalid, the function attempts
a more conservative generalization by eliminating only
one of those conjuncts, keeping the other. We call a rule
obtained in this way a generalization of ρ. Such a rule
is more general than ρ in the sense that it refers to
relationships instead of specific values. Also, the user-
permission relation induced by a generalization of ρ is
a superset of the user-permission relation induced by ρ.
If there are no valid generalizations of ρ,
generalizeRule(ρ, cc, uncovUP ,Rules) returns ρ. If
there is a valid generalization of ρ, generalizeRule(ρ, cc,
uncovUP ,Rules) returns the generalization ρ′ of ρ with
the best quality according to a given rule quality metric.
Note that ρ′ may cover tuples that are already covered
(i.e., are in UP ); in other words, our algorithm can
generate policies containing rules whose meanings
overlap. A rule quality metric is a function Qrul(ρ,UP)
that maps a rule ρ to a totally-ordered set, with
the ordering chosen so that larger values indicate
high quality. The second argument UP is a set of
user-permission tuples. Based on our primary goal
of minimizing the generated policy’s WSC, and a
secondary preference for rules with more constraints,
we define
Qrul(ρ,UP) = 〈| [[ρ]] ∩UP |/WSC(ρ), |con(ρ)|〉.
The secondary preference for more constraints is a
heuristic, based on the observation that rules with more
// Rules is the set of candidate rules
1: Rules = ∅
// uncovUP contains user-permission tuples in UP0
// that are not covered by Rules
2: uncovUP = UP0.copy()
3: while ¬uncovUP .isEmpty()
// Select an uncovered user-permission tuple.
4: 〈u, r, o〉 = some tuple in uncovUP
5: cc = candidateConstraint(r, u)
// su contains users with permission 〈r, o〉 and
// that have the same candidate constraint for r as u
6: su = {u′ ∈ U | 〈u′, r, o〉 ∈ UP0
7: ∧ candidateConstraint(r, u′) = cc}
8: addCandidateRule(su, {r}, {o}, cc, uncovUP ,Rules)
// so is set of operations that u can apply to r
9: so = {o′ ∈ Op | 〈u, r, o′〉 ∈ UP0}
10: addCandidateRule({u}, {r}, so, cc, uncovUP ,Rules)
11: end while
// Repeatedly merge and simplify rules, until
// this has no effect
12: mergeRules(Rules)
13: while simplifyRules(Rules) && mergeRules(Rules)
14: skip
15: end while
// Select high quality rules into final result Rules ′.
16: Rules ′ = ∅
17: Repeatedly select the highest quality rules from
Rules to Rules ′ until
∑
ρ∈Rules′ [[ρ]] = UP0,
using UP0 \
[[
Rules ′
]]
as second argument to Qrul
18: return Rules ′
Fig. 1. Policy mining algorithm.
constraints tend to be more general than other rules
with the same | [[ρ]] ∩ UP |/WSC(ρ) (such rules typically
have more conjuncts) and hence lead to lower WSC.
In generalizeRule, uncovUP is the second argument to
Qrul, so [[ρ]] ∩ UP is the set of user-permission tuples
in UP0 that are covered by ρ and not covered by rules
already in the policy. The loop over i near the end of the
pseudocode for generalizeRule considers all possibilities
for the first atomic constraint in cc that gets added to
the constraint of ρ. The function calls itself recursively
to determine the subsequent atomic constraints in c that
get added to the constraint.
The function mergeRules(Rules) in Figure 4 attempts
to reduce the WSC of Rules by removing redundant rules
and merging pairs of rules. A rule ρ in Rules is redundant
if Rules contains another rule ρ′ such that [[ρ]] ⊆ [[ρ′]].
Informally, rules ρ1 and ρ2 are merged by taking, for
each attribute, the union of the conjuncts in ρ1 and ρ2
for that attribute. If the resulting rule ρmerge is valid,
ρmerge is added to Rules , and ρ1 and ρ2 and any other
rules that are now redundant are removed from Rules .
mergeRules(Rules) updates its argument Rules in place,
and it returns a Boolean indicating whether any rules
were merged.
5function addCandidateRule(su, sr, so, cc, uncovUP ,Rules)
// Construct a rule ρ that covers user-permission
// tuples {〈u, r, o〉 | u ∈ su ∧ r ∈ sr ∧ o ∈ so}.
1: eu = computeUAE(su, U)
2: er = computeRAE(sr, R)
3: ρ = 〈eu, er, so, ∅〉
4: ρ′ = generalizeRule(ρ, cc, uncovUP ,Rules)
5: Rules.add(ρ′)
6: uncovUP .removeAll([[ρ′]])
Fig. 2. Compute a candidate rule ρ′ and add ρ′ to
candidate rule set Rules
The function simplifyRules(Rules) attempts to simplify
all of the rules in Rules . It updates its argument Rules in
place, replacing rules in Rules with simplified versions
when simplification succeeds. It returns a Boolean indi-
cating whether any rules were simplified. It attempts to
simplify each rule in the following ways. (1) It eliminates
sets that are supersets of other sets in conjuncts for multi-
valued user attributes. The ⊇-based semantics for such
conjuncts implies that this does not change the meaning
of the conjunct. For example, a conjunct {{a}, {a, b}}
is simplified to {{a}}. (2) It eliminates elements from
sets in conjuncts for multi-valued user attributes when
this preserves validity of the rule; note that this might
increase but cannot decrease the meaning of a rule. For
example, if every user whose specialties include a also
have specialty b, and a rule contains the conjunct {{a, b}}
for the specialties attribute, then b will be eliminated
from that conjunct. (3) It eliminates conjuncts from a rule
when this preserves validity of the rule. Since removing
one conjunct might prevent removal of another conjunct,
it searches for the set of conjuncts to remove that max-
imizes the quality of the resulting rule, while preserv-
ing validity. The user can specify a set of unremovable
attributes, i.e., attributes for which simplifyRules should
not try to eliminate the conjunct, because eliminating it
would increase the risk of generating an overly general
policy, i.e., a policy that might grant inappropriate per-
missions when new users or new resources (hence new
permissions) are added to the system. Our experience
suggests that appropriate unremovable attributes can
be identified based on the obvious importance of some
attributes and by examination of the policy generated
without specification of unremovable attributes. (4) It
eliminates atomic constraints from a rule when this
preserves validity of the rule. It searches for the set of
atomic constraints to remove that maximizes the quality
of the resulting rule, while preserving validity. (5) It
eliminates overlapping values between rules. Specifi-
cally, a value v in the conjunct for a user attribute a
in a rule ρ is removed if there is another rule ρ′ in
the policy such that (i) attr(uae(ρ′)) ⊆ attr(uae(ρ)) and
attr(rae(ρ′)) ⊆ attr(rae(ρ)), (ii) the conjunct of uae(ρ′) for
a contains v, (iii) each conjunct of uae(ρ′) or rae(ρ′) other
than the conjunct for a is either > or a superset of the
function generalizeRule(ρ, cc, uncovUP ,Rules)
// ρbest is highest-quality generalization of ρ
1: ρbest = ρ
// cc′ contains formulas from cc that lead to valid
// generalizations of ρ.
2: cc′ = new Vector()
3: // gen[i] is a generalization of ρ using cc′[i]
4: gen = new Vector()
// find formulas in cc that lead to valid
// generalizations of ρ.
5: for f in cc
// try to generalize ρ by adding f and elimi-
// nating conjuncts for both attributes used in f .
6: ρ′ = 〈uae(ρ)[uAttr(f) 7→ >], rae(ρ)[rAttr(f) 7→ >],
7: ops(ρ), con(ρ) ∪ {f}〉
// check if [[ρ′]] is a valid rule
8: if [[ρ′]] ⊆ UP0
9: cc′.add(f)
10: gen.add(ρ′)
11: else
// try to generalize ρ by adding f and elimi-
// nating conjunct for one user attribute used in f
12: ρ′ = 〈uae(ρ)[uAttr(f) 7→ >], rae(ρ),
13: ops(ρ), con(ρ) ∪ {f}〉
14: if [[ρ′]] ⊆ UP0
15: cc′.add(f)
16: gen.add(ρ′)
17: else
// try to generalize ρ by adding f and elimi-
// nating conjunct for one resource attribute used in f .
18: ρ′ = 〈uae(ρ), rae(ρ)[rAttr(f) 7→ >],
19: ops(ρ), con(ρ) ∪ {f}〉
20: if [[ρ′]] ⊆ UP0
21: cc′.add(f)
22: gen.add(ρ′)
23: end if
24: end if
25: end if
26: end for
27: for i = 1 to cc′.length
28: // try to further generalize gen[i]
29: ρ′′ = generalizeRule(gen[i], cc′[i+1 ..], uncovUP ,
30: Rules)
31: if Qrul(ρ′′, uncovUP) > Qrul(ρbest, uncovUP)
32: ρbest = ρ′′
33: end if
34: end for
35: return ρbest
Fig. 3. Generalize rule ρ by adding some formulas from
cc to its constraint and eliminating conjuncts for attributes
used in those formulas. f [x 7→ y] denotes a copy of
function f modified so that f(x) = y. a[i..] denotes the
suffix of array a starting at index i.
6function mergeRules(Rules)
1: // Remove redundant rules
2: rdtRules = {ρ ∈ Rules | ∃ ρ′ ∈ Rules \ {ρ}. [[ρ]] ⊆ [[ρ′]]}
3: Rules.removeAll(rdtRules)
4: // Merge rules
5: workSet = {(ρ1, ρ2) | ρ1 ∈ Rules ∧ ρ2 ∈ Rules
∧ ρ1 6= ρ2 ∧ con(ρ1) = con(ρ2)}
6: while not(workSet.empty())
// Remove an arbitrary element of the workset
7: (ρ1, ρ2) = workSet .remove()
8: ρmerge = 〈uae(ρ1) ∪ uae(ρ2), rae(ρ1) ∪ rae(ρ2),
ops(ρ1) ∪ ops(ρ2), con(ρ1)〉
9: if [[ρmerge]] ⊆ UP0
// The merged rule is valid. Add it to Rules ,
// and remove rules that became redundant.
10: rdtRules = {ρ ∈ Rules | [[ρ]] ⊆ [[ρmerge]]}
11: Rules.removeAll(rdtRules)
12: workSet .removeAll({(ρ1, ρ2) ∈ workSet |
ρ1 ∈ rdtRules ∨ ρ2 ∈ rdtRules})
13: workSet .addAll({(ρmerge, ρ) | ρ ∈ Rules
∧ con(ρ) = con(ρmerge)})
14: Rules.add(ρmerge)
15: end if
16: end while
17: return true if any rules were merged
Fig. 4. Merge pairs of rules in Rules, when possible, to
reduce the WSC of Rules. (a, b) denotes an unordered
pair with components a and b. The union e = e1 ∪ e2 of
attribute expressions e1 and e2 over the same set A of
attributes is defined by: for all attributes a inA, if e1(a) = >
or e2(a) = > then e(a) = > otherwise e(a) = e1(a)∪e2(a).
corresponding conjunct of ρ, and (iv) con(ρ′) ⊆ con(ρ).
The condition for removal of a value in the conjunct
for a resource attribute is analogous. If a conjunct of
uae(ρ) or rae(ρ) becomes empty, ρ is removed from the
policy. For example, if a policy contains the rules 〈dept ∈
{d1, d2} ∧ position = p1, type = t1, read,dept = dept〉 and
〈dept ∈ {d1} ∧ position = p1, type ∈ {t1, t2}, read,dept =
dept〉, then d1 is eliminated from the former rule. (6)
It eliminates overlapping operations between rules. The
details are similar to those for elimination of overlapping
values between rules. For example, if a policy contains
the rules 〈dept = d1, type = t1, read,dept = dept〉 and
〈dept = d1∧position = p1, type = t1, {read,write},dept =
dept〉, then read is eliminated from the latter rule.
Asymptotic Running Time: The algorithm’s overall
running time is worst-case cubic in |UP0|. A detailed
analysis of the asymptotic running time appears in Sec-
tion 9 in the Supplemental Material. In the experiments
with sample policies and synthetic policies described
in Section 5, the observed running time is roughly
quadratic and roughly linear, respectively, in |UP0|.
Attribute Selection: Attribute data may contain
attributes irrelevant to access control. This potentially
hurts the effectiveness and performance of policy min-
ing algorithms [9], [10]. Therefore, before applying our
algorithm to a dataset that might contain irrelevant
attributes, it is advisable to use the method in [9] or [11]
to determine the relevance of each attribute to the user-
permission assignment and then eliminate attributes
with low relevance.
Processing Order: The order in which tuples and
rules are processed can affect the mined policy. The order
in which our algorithm processes tuples and rules is
described in Section 10 in the Supplemental Material.
Optimizations: Our implementation incorporates a
few optimizations not reflected in the pseudocode but
described in Section 11 in the Supplemental Material.
The most novel optimization is that rules are merged
(by calling mergeRules) periodically, not only after all
of UP0 has been covered. This is beneficial because
merging sometimes has the side-effect of generalization,
which causes more user-permission tuples to be covered
without explicitly considering them as seeds.
4.1 Noise Detection
In practice, the given user-permission relation often con-
tains noise, consisting of over-assignments and under-
assignments. An over-assignment is when a permission is
inappropriately granted to a user. An under-assignment
is when a user lacks a permission that he or she should
be granted. Noise incurs security risks and significant IT
support effort [11]. This section describes extensions of
our algorithm to handle noise. The extended algorithm
detects and reports suspected noise and generates an
ABAC policy that is consistent with its notion of the
correct user-permission relation (i.e., with the suspected
noise removed). The user should examine the suspected
noise and decide which parts of it are actual noise (i.e.,
errors in the user-permission relation). If all of it is actual
noise, then the policy already generated is the desired
one; otherwise, the user should remove the parts that
are actual noise from the user-permission relation to
obtain a correct user-permission relation and then run
the algorithm without the noise detection extension on
it to generate the desired ABAC policy.
Over-assignments are often the result of incomplete re-
vocation of old permissions when users change job func-
tions [11]. Therefore, over-assignments usually cannot be
captured concisely using rules with attribute expressions
that refer to the current attribute information, so a candi-
date rule constructed from a user-permission tuple that
is an over-assignment is less likely to be generalized and
merged with other rules, and that candidate rule will
end up as a low-quality rule in the generated policy. So,
to detect over-assignments, we introduce a rule quality
threshold τ . The rule quality metric used here is the first
component of the metric used in the loop in Figure 1 that
constructs Rules ′; thus, τ is a threshold on the value of
Qrul(ρ, uncovUP), and the rules with quality less than or
equal to τ form a suffix of the sequence of rules added
7to Rules ′. The extended algorithm reports as suspected
over-assignments the user-permission tuples covered in
Rules ′ only by rules with quality less than or equal to
τ , and then it removes rules with quality less than or
equal to τ from Rules ′. Adjustment of τ is guided by the
user. For example, the user might guess a percentage of
over-assignments (e.g., 3%) based on experience, and let
the system adjust τ until the number of reported over-
assignments is that percentage of |UP0|.
To detect under-assignments, we look for rules that are
almost valid, i.e., rules that would be valid if a relatively
small number of tuples were added to UP0. A parameter
α quantifies the notion of “relatively small”. A rule is
α almost valid if the fraction of invalid user-permission
tuples in [[ρ]] is at most α, i.e., | [[ρ]] \ UP0| ÷ | [[ρ]] | ≤ α.
In places where the policy mining algorithm checks
whether a rule is valid, if the rule is α almost valid, the
algorithm treats it as if it were valid. The extended algo-
rithm reports
⋃
ρ∈Rules′ [[ρ]] \UP0 as the set of suspected
under-assignments, and (as usual) it returns Rules ′ as
the generated policy. Adjustment of α is guided by the
user, similarly as for the over-assignment threshold τ .
5 EVALUATION
The general methodology used for evaluation is de-
scribed in Section 1. We applied this methodology to
sample policies and synthetic policies. Evaluation on
policies (including attribute data) from real organiza-
tions would be ideal, but we are not aware of any
suitable and publicly available policies from real or-
ganizations. Therefore, we developed sample policies
that, although not based directly on specific real-world
case studies, are intended to be similar to policies that
might be found in the application domains for which
they are named. The sample policies are relatively small
and intended to resemble interesting core parts of full-
scale policies in those application domains. Despite their
modest size, they are a significant test of the effective-
ness of our algorithm, because they express non-trivial
policies and exercise all features of our policy language,
including use of set membership and superset relations
in attribute expressions and constraints. The synthetic
policies are used primarily to assess the behavior of the
algorithm as a function of parameters controlling specific
structural characteristics of the policies.
We implemented our policy mining algorithm in Java
and ran experiments on a laptop with a 2.5 GHz Intel
Core i5 CPU. All of the code and data is available
at http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/∼stoller/. In our experi-
ments, the weights wi in the definition of WSC equal 1.
5.1 Evaluation on Sample Policies
We developed four sample policies, each consisting of
rules and a manually written attribute dataset containing
a small number of instances of each type of user and
resource. We also generated synthetic attribute datasets
for each sample policy. The sample policies are described
very briefly in this section. Details of the sample policies,
including all policy rules, some illustrative manually
written attribute data, and a more detailed description of
the synthetic attribute data generation algorithm appear
in Section 12 in the Supplemental Material.
Figure 5 provides information about their size. Al-
though the sample policies are relatively small when
measured by a coarse metric such as number of rules,
they are complex, because each rule has a lot of structure.
For example, the number of well-formed rules built
using the attributes and constants in each policy and
that satisfy the strictest syntactic size limits satisfied by
rules in the sample policies (at most one conjunct in each
UAE, at most two conjuncts in each RAE, at most two
atomic constraints in each constraint, at most one atomic
value in each UAE conjunct, at most two atomic values
in each RAE conjunct, etc.) is more than 1012 for the
sample policies with manually written attribute data and
is much higher for the sample policies with synthetic
attribute data and the synthetic policies.
In summary, our algorithm is very effective for all
three sample policies: there are only small differences
between the original and mined policies if no attributes
are declared unremovable, and the original and mined
policies are identical if the resource-type attribute is
declared unremovable.
University Sample Policy: Our university sample
policy controls access by students, instructors, teaching
assistants, registrar officers, department chairs, and ad-
missions officers to applications (for admission), grade-
books, transcripts, and course schedules. If no attributes
are declared unremovable, the generated policy is the
same as the original ABAC policy except that the RAE
conjunct “type=transcript” is replaced with the con-
straint “department=department” in one rule. If resource
type is declared unremovable, the generated policy is
identical to the original ABAC policy.
Health Care Sample Policy: Our health care sam-
ple policy controls access by nurses, doctors, patients,
and agents (e.g., a patient’s spouse) to electronic health
records (HRs) and HR items (i.e., entries in health
records). If no attributes are declared unremovable, the
generated policy is the same as the original ABAC
policy except that the RAE conjunct “type=HRitem” is
eliminated from four rules; that conjunct is unneces-
sary, because those rules also contain a conjunct for
the “topic” attribute, and the “topic” attribute is used
only for resources with type=HRitem. If resource type is
declared unremovable, the generated policy is identical
to the original ABAC policy.
Project Management Sample Policy: Our project
management sample policy controls access by depart-
ment managers, project leaders, employees, contractors,
auditors, accountants, and planners to budgets, sched-
ules, and tasks associated with projects. If no attributes
are declared unremovable, the generated policy is the
same as the original ABAC policy except that the RAE
conjunct “type=task” is eliminated from three rules; the
8Policy |Rules| |Au| |Ar| |Op| Type N |U | |R| |Vals| |UP | |̂[[ρ]]|
university 10 6 5 9 man 2 22 34 76 168 19
syn 10 479 997 1651 8374 837
syn 20 920 1918 3166 24077 2408
health care 9 6 7 3 man 2 21 16 55 51 6.7
syn 10 200 720 1386 1532 195
syn 20 400 1440 2758 3098 393
project mgmt 11 8 6 7 man 2 19 40 77 189 19
syn 10 100 200 543 960 96
syn 20 200 400 1064 1920 193
Fig. 5. Sizes of the sample policies. “Type” indicates whether the attribute data in the policy is manually written (“man”)
or synthetic (“syn”). N is the number of departments for the university and project management sample policies, and
the number of wards for the health care sample policy. |̂[[ρ]]| is the average number of user-permission tuples that
satisfy each rule. An empty cell indicates the same value as the cell above it.
explanation is similar to the above explanation for the
health care sample policy. If resource type is declared
unremovable, the generated policy is identical to the
original ABAC policy.
Running Time on Synthetic Attribute Data: We
generated a series of pseudorandom synthetic attribute
datasets for the sample policies, parameterized by a
number N , which is the number of departments for the
university and project management sample policies, and
the number of wards for the health care sample policy.
The generated attribute data for users and resources as-
sociated with each department or ward are similar to but
more numerous than the attribute data in the manually
written datasets. Figure 5 contains information about the
sizes of the policies with synthetic attribute data, for
selected values of N . Policies for the largest shown value
of N are generated as described in Section 12 in the
Supplemental Material; policies for smaller values of N
are prefixes of them. Each row contains the average over
20 synthetic policies with the specified N . For all sizes
of synthetic attribute data, the mined policies are the
same as with the manually generated attribute data. This
reflects that larger attribute datasets are not necessarily
harder to mine from, if they represent more instances of
the same rules; the complexity is primarily in the struc-
ture of the rules. Figure 6 shows the algorithm’s running
time as a function of N . Each data point is an average of
the running times on 20 policies with synthetic attribute
data. Error bars (too small to see in most cases) show 95%
confidence intervals using Student’s t-distribution. The
running time is a roughly quadratic function of N for
all three sample policies, with different constant factors.
Different constant factors are expected, because policies
are very complex structures, and N captures only one
aspect of the size and difficulty of the policy mining
problem instance. For example, the constant factors are
larger for the university sample policy mainly because
it has larger |UP |, as a function of N , than the other
sample policies. For example, Figure 5 shows that |UP |
for the university sample policy with N = 10 is larger
than |UP | for the other sample policies with N = 20.
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Fig. 6. Running time (log scale) of the algorithm on
synthetic attribute datasets for sample policies. The hori-
zontal axis isNdept for university and project management
sample policies and Nward for health care sample policy.
Benefit of Periodic Rule Merging Optimization:
It is not obvious a priori whether the savings from
periodic merging of rules outweighs the cost. In fact,
the net benefit grows with policy size. For example, for
the university policy with synthetic attribute data, this
optimization provides a speedup of (67 sec)/(40 sec) =
1.7 for Ndept = 10 and a speedup of (1012 sec)/(102 sec)
= 9.9 for Ndept = 15.
5.2 Evaluation on Synthetic Policies
We also evaluated our algorithm on synthetic ABAC
policies. On the positive side, synthetic policies can be
generated in all sizes and with varying structural char-
acteristics. On the other hand, even though our synthesis
algorithm is designed to generate policies with some re-
alistic characteristics, the effectiveness and performance
of our algorithm on synthetic policies might not be
representative of its effectiveness and performance on
real policies. For experiments with synthetic policies, we
9compare the syntactic similarity and WSC of the syn-
thetic ABAC policy and the mined ABAC policy. Syntac-
tic similarity of policies measures the syntactic similarity
of rules in the policies. It ranges from 0 (completely dif-
ferent) to 1 (identical). The detailed definition of syntactic
similarity is in Section 14 in the Supplemental Material.
We do not expect high syntactic similarity between the
synthetic and mined ABAC policies, because synthetic
policies tend to be unnecessarily complicated, and mined
policies tend to be more concise. Thus, we consider the
policy mining algorithm to be effective if the mined
ABAC policy Rulesmined is simpler (i.e., has lower WSC)
than the original synthetic ABAC policy Rulessyn. We
compare them using the compression factor, defined as
WSC(Rulessyn)/WSC(Rulesmined). Thus, a compression
factor above 1 is good, and larger is better.
Synthetic Policy Generation: Our policy synthesis
algorithm first generates the rules and then uses the
rules to guide generation of the attribute data; this
allows control of the number of granted permissions.
Our synthesis algorithm takes Nrule, the desired number
of rules, Nmincnj , the minimum number of conjuncts in each
attribute expression, and Nmincns , the minimum number
of constraints in each rule, as inputs. The numbers of
users and resources are not specified directly but are
proportional to the number of rules, since our algo-
rithm generates new users and resources to satisfy each
generated rule, as sketched below. Rule generation is
based on several statistical distributions, which are either
based loosely on our sample policies or assumed to have
a simple functional form (e.g., uniform distribution or
Zipf distribution). For example, the distribution of the
number of conjuncts in each attribute expression is based
loosely on our sample policies and ranges from Nmincnj
to Nmincnj + 3, the distribution of the number of atomic
constraints in each constraint is based loosely on our
sample policies and ranges from Nmincns to Nmincns + 2, and
the distribution of attributes in attribute expressions is
assumed to be uniform (i.e., each attribute is equally
likely to be selected for use in each conjunct).
The numbers of user attributes and resource attributes
are fixed at Nattr = 8 (this is the maximum number
of attributes relevant to access control for the datasets
presented in [12]). Our synthesis algorithm adopts a
simple type system, with 7 types, and with at least one
user attribute and one resource attribute of each type.
For each type t, the cardinality c(t) is selected from a
uniform distribution on the interval [2, 10Nrule + 2], the
target ratio between the frequencies of the most and
least frequent values of type t is chosen to be 1, 10, or
100 with probability 0.2 0.7, and 0.1, respectively, and
a skew s(t) is computed so that the Zipf distribution
with cardinality c(t) and skew s(t) has that frequency
ratio. When assigning a value to an attribute of type
t, the value is selected from the Zipf distribution with
cardinality c(t) and skew s(t). Types are also used when
generating constraints: constraints relate attributes with
the same type.
For each rule ρ, our algorithm ensures that there are
at least Nurp = 16 user-resource pairs 〈u, r〉 such that
〈u, r, o〉 |= ρ for some operation o. The algorithm first
checks how many pairs of an existing user and an
existing resource (which were generated for previous
rules) satisfy ρ or can be made to satisfy ρ by appropriate
choice of values for attributes with unknown values
(i.e., ⊥). If the count is less than Nurp, the algorithm
generates additional users and resources that together
satisfy ρ. With the resulting modest number of users
and resources, some conjuncts in the UAE and RAE are
likely to be unnecessary (i.e., eliminating them does not
grant additional permissions to any existing user). In
a real policy with sufficiently large numbers of users
and resources, all conjuncts are likely be to necessary. To
emulate this situation with a modest number of users, for
each rule ρ, for each conjunct eu(au) in the UAE eu in ρ,
the algorithm generates a user u′ by copying an existing
user u that (together with some resource) satisfies ρ and
then changing du(u′, au) to some value not in eu(au).
Similarly, the algorithm adds resources to increase the
chance that conjuncts in resource attribute expressions
are necessary, and it adds users and resources to increase
the chance that constraints are necessary. The algorithm
initially assigns values only to the attributes needed to
ensure that a user or resource satisfies the rule under
consideration. To make the attribute data more realistic,
a final step of the algorithm assigns values to additional
attributes until the fraction of attribute values equal to
⊥ reaches a target fraction ν⊥ = 0.1.
Results for Varying Number of Conjuncts: To
explore the effect of varying the number of conjuncts,
we generated synthetic policies with Nrule ranging from
10 to 50 in steps of 20, with Nmincnj ranging from 4 to 0, and
with Nmincns = 0. For each value of Nrule, synthetic policies
with smaller Nmincnj are obtained by removing conjuncts
from synthetic policies with larger Nmincnj . For each com-
bination of parameter values (in these experiments and
the experiments with varying number of constraints and
varying overlap between rules), we generate 50 synthetic
policies and average the results. Some experimental re-
sults appear in Figure 7. For each value of Nrule, as the
number of conjuncts decreases, |UP | increases (because
the numbers of users and resources satisfying each rule
increase), the syntactic similarity increases (because as
there are fewer conjuncts in each rule in the synthetic
policy, it is more likely that the remaining conjuncts are
important and will also appear in the mined policy),
and the compression factor decreases (because as the
policies get more similar, the compression factor must
get closer to 1). For example, for Nrule = 50, as Nmincnj
decreases from 4 to 0, average |UP | increases from 1975
to 11969, average syntactic similarity increases from 0.62
to 0.75, and average compression factor decreases from
1.75 to 0.84. The figure also shows the density of the
policies, where the density of a policy is defined as
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|UP | ÷ (|U | × |P |), where the set of granted permissions
is P =
⋃
〈u,r,o〉∈UP{〈r, o〉}. The average densities all fall
within the range of densities seen in the 9 real-world
datasets shown in [13, Table 1], namely, 0.003 to 0.19.
Density is a decreasing function of Nrule, because |UP |,
|U |, and |P | each grow roughly linearly as functions of
Nrule. The standard deviations of some quantities are
relatively large in some cases, but, as the relatively small
confidence intervals indicate, this is due to the intrinsic
variability of the synthetic policies generated by our
algorithm, not due to insufficient samples.
Results for Varying Number of Constraints: To
explore the effect of varying the number of constraints,
we generated synthetic policies with Nrule ranging from
10 to 50 in steps of 20, with Nmincns ranging from 2 to 0,
and with Nmincnj = 0. For each value of Nrule, policies with
smaller Nmincns are obtained by removing constraints from
synthetic policies with larger Nmincns . Some experimental
results appear in Figure 8. For each value of Nrule, as the
number of constraints decreases, |UP | increases (because
the numbers of users and resources satisfying each rule
increase), syntactic similarity decreases (because our al-
gorithm gives preference to constraints over conjuncts,
so when Nmincns is small, the mined policy tends to have
more constraints and fewer conjuncts than the synthetic
policy), and the compression factor decreases (because
the additional constraints in the mined policy cause each
rule in the mined policy to cover fewer user-permission
tuples on average, increasing the number of rules and
hence the WSC). For example, for Nrule = 50, as Nmincns
decreases from 2 to 0, average |UP | increases from 3560
to 26472, average syntactic similarity decreases slightly
from 0.67 to 0.64, and average compression factor de-
creases from 1.29 to 0.96.
Results for Varying Overlap Between Rules: We
also explored the effect of varying overlap between rules,
to test our conjecture that policies with more overlap
between rules are harder to reconstruct through policy
mining. The overlap between rules ρ1 and ρ2 is [[ρ1]]∩[[ρ2]].
To increase the average overlap between pairs of rules
in a synthetic policy, we extended the policy generation
algorithm so that, after generating each rule ρ, with
probability Pover the algorithm generates another rule
ρ′ obtained from ρ by randomly removing one conjunct
from uae(ρ) and adding one conjunct (generated in the
usual way) to rae(ρ); typically, ρ and ρ′ have a significant
amount of overlap. We also add users and resources that
together satisfy ρ′, so that [[ρ′]] 6⊆ [[ρ]], otherwise ρ′ is
redundant. This construction is based on a pattern that
occurs a few times in our sample policies. We generated
synthetic policies with 30 rules, using the extended
algorithm described above. For each value of Nrule, we
generated synthetic policies with Pover ranging from 0 to
1 in steps of 0.25, and with Nmincnj = 2 and N
min
cns = 0. Some
experimental results appear in Figure 9. For each value of
Nrule, as Pover increases, the syntactic similarity decreases
(because our algorithm effectively removes overlap, i.e.,
produces policies with relatively little overlap), and the
compression factor increases (because removal of more
overlap makes the mined policy more concise). For
example, for Nrule = 50, as Pover increases from 0 to 1, the
syntactic similarity decreases slightly from 0.74 to 0.71,
and the compression factor increases from 1.16 to 1.23.
5.3 Generalization
A potential concern with optimization-based policy min-
ing algorithms is that the mined policies might over-
fit the given data and hence not be robust, i.e., not
generalize well, in the sense that the policy requires
modifications to accommodate new users. To evaluate
how well policies generated by our algorithm generalize,
we applied the following methodology, based on [9].
The inputs to the methodology are an ABAC policy
mining algorithm, an ABAC policy pi, and a fraction
f (informally, f is the fraction of the data used for
training); the output is a fraction e called the general-
ization error of the policy mining algorithm on policy
pi for fraction f . Given a set U ′ of users and a policy
pi, the associated resources for U ′ are the resources r
such that pi grants some user in U ′ some permission
on r. To compute the generalization error, repeat the
following procedure 10 times and average the results:
randomly select a subset U ′ of the user set U of pi
with |U ′|/|U | = f , randomly select a subset R′ of the
associated resources for U ′ with |R′|/|R| = f , generate
an ACL policy piACL containing only the permissions for
users in U ′ for resources in R′, apply the policy mining
algorithm to piACL with the attribute data to generate an
ABAC policy pigen, compute the generalization error as
the fraction of incorrectly assigned permissions for users
not in U ′ and resources not in R′, i.e., as |S 	 S′|/|S|,
where S = {〈u, r, o〉 ∈ [[pi]] | u ∈ U \ U ′ ∧ r ∈ R \ R′},
S′ = {〈u, r, o〉 ∈ [[pi′]] | u ∈ U \ U ′ ∧ r ∈ R \ R′}, and 	 is
symmetric set difference.
We measured generalization error for f from 0.1 to
0.5 in steps of 0.05 for the university (with Ndept = 40),
health care (with Nward = 40), and project management
(with Ndept = 40) sample policies. For the university
and health care sample policies, the generalization error
is zero in all these cases. For the project management
sample policy, the generalization error is 0.11 at f = 0.1,
drops roughly linearly to zero at f = 0.35, and remains
zero thereafter. There are no other existing ABAC policy
mining algorithms, so a direct comparison of the gener-
alization results from our algorithm with generalization
results from algorithms based on other approaches, e.g.,
probabilistic models, is not currently possible. Neverthe-
less, these results are promising and suggest that policies
generated by our algorithm generalize reasonably well.
5.4 Noise
Permission Noise: To evaluate the effectiveness of
our noise detection techniques in the presence of permis-
sion noise, we started with an ABAC policy, generated
11
Nrule N
min
cnj |U | |R| |UP | |̂[[ρ]]| Density Synt. Sim. Compression Time
µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ CI µ σ CI µ σ CI
10 4 206 16 62 5.7 401 90 35 9.2 .069 .01 .63 0.04 0.011 1.79 .21 .060 0.30 0.31 0.09
2 620 116 136 29 .076 .01 .69 0.03 0.009 1.55 .18 .051 0.47 0.19 0.05
0 1025 222 298 62 .081 .01 .78 0.05 0.014 1.12 .16 .045 1.02 0.42 0.12
50 4 1008 38 318 15 1975 282 36 5.3 .014 .001 .62 0.02 0.006 1.75 .08 .023 4.86 1.71 0.49
2 3314 526 144 20 .015 .001 .68 0.02 0.006 1.52 .08 .023 11.78 3.41 0.97
0 11969 5192 438 136 .025 .007 .75 0.03 0.009 0.84 .18 .051 58.88 18.7 5.31
Fig. 7. Experimental results for synthetic policies with varying Nmincnj . “Synt. Sim.” is syntactic similarity. “Compression”
is the compression factor. µ is mean, σ is standard deviation, and CI is half-width of 95% confidence interval using
Student’s t-distribution. An empty cell indicates the same value as the cell above it.
Nrule N
min
cns |U | |R| |UP | |̂[[ρ]]| Density Synt. Sim. Compression Time
µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ CI µ σ CI µ σ CI
10 2 172 19 54 6.5 529 162 49 15 .084 .020 .72 .04 .011 1.50 .14 .040 0.28 0.17 0.05
1 679 174 105 32 .093 .018 .72 .05 .014 1.43 .18 .051 0.36 0.17 0.05
0 917 325 172 57 .110 .034 .70 .05 .014 1.30 .20 .057 0.49 0.20 0.06
50 2 781 51 276 16 3560 596 61 9.9 .020 .003 .67 .02 .006 1.29 .14 .040 12.72 3.95 1.12
1 5062 1186 137 28 .024 .004 .66 .02 .006 1.15 .14 .040 16.78 5.09 1.45
0 8057 2033 241 56 .031 .006 0.64 .02 .006 0.96 0.13 .037 23.38 6.78 1.93
Fig. 8. Experimental results for synthetic policies with varying Nmincns .
an ACL policy, added noise, and applied our policy min-
ing algorithm to the resulting policy. To add a specified
level ν of permission noise, measured as a percentage
of |UP0|, we added ν|UP0|/6 under-assignments and
5ν|UP0|/6 over-assignments to the ACL policy gener-
ated from the ABAC policy. This ratio is based on the
ratio of Type I and Type II errors in [11, Table 1].
The over-assignments are user-permission tuples gener-
ated by selecting the user, resource, and operation from
categorical distributions with approximately normally
distributed probabilities (“approximately” because the
normal distribution is truncated on the sides to have the
appropriate finite domain); we adopted this approach
from [11]. The under-assignments are removals of user-
permission tuples generated in the same way. For each
noise level, we ran our policy mining algorithm with
noise detection inside a loop that searched for the best
values of α (considering values between 0.01 and 0.09
in steps of .01) and τ (considering 0.08, values between
0.1 and 0.9 in steps of 0.1, and between 1 and 10 in
steps of 1), because we expect τ to depend on the
noise level, and we want to simulate an experienced
administrator, so that the results reflect the capabilities
and limitations of the noise detection technique rather
than the administrator. The best values of α and τ are the
ones that maximize the Jaccard similarity of the actual
(injected) noise and the reported noise. ROC curves that
illustrate the trade-off between false positives and false
negatives when tuning the values of α and τ appear in
Section 15 in the Supplemental Material.
We started with the university (with Ndept = 4),
health care (with Nward = 6), and project management
(with Ndept = 6) sample policies with synthetic attribute
data (we also did some experiments with larger policy
instances and got similar results), and with synthetic
policies with Nrule = 20. Figure 10 shows the Jaccard
similarity of the actual and reported over-assignments
and the Jaccard similarity of the actual and reported
under-assignments. Note that, for a policy mining al-
gorithm without noise detection (hence the reported
noise is the empty set), these Jaccard similarities would
be 0. Each data point is an average over 10 policies,
and error bars (too small to see in some cases, and
omitted when the standard deviation is 0) show 95%
confidence intervals using Student’s t-distribution. Over-
assignment detection is accurate, with average Jaccard
similarity always 0.94 or higher (in our experiments).
Under-assignment detection is very good for university
and project management, with average Jaccard similarity
always 0.93 or higher, but less accurate for health care
and synthetic policies, with average Jaccard similar-
ity always 0.63 or higher. Intuitively, detecting over-
assignments is somewhat easier, because it is unlikely
that there are high-quality rules that cover the over-
assignments, so we mostly get rules that do not over-
assign and hence the over-assignments get classified
correctly. However, under-assignments are more likely
to affect the generated rules, leading to mis-classification
of under-assignments. As a function of noise level in
the considered range, the Jaccard similarities are flat in
some cases and generally trend slightly downward in
other cases. Figure 11 shows the semantic similarity of
the original and mined policies. Note that, for a policy
mining algorithm without noise detection, the semantic
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Nrule Pover |U | |R| |UP | |̂[[ρ]]| Density Synt. Sim. Compression Time
µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ CI µ σ CI µ σ CI
50 0 693 37 247 15 5246 1445 92.3 30.0 .029 .006 .74 .02 .006 1.16 .11 .03 12.39 6.34 1.80
0.5 655 53 216 16 7325 1838 333 69.6 .039 .008 .73 .03 .009 1.18 .21 .06 11.64 4.95 1.41
1 664 58 216 16 7094 1473 563 109 .038 .006 .71 .03 .009 1.23 .29 .08 11.34 4.08 1.16
Fig. 9. Experimental results for synthetic policies with varying Pover.
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Fig. 10. Jaccard similarity of actual and reported under-
assignments, and Jaccard similarity of actual and re-
ported over-assignments, as a function of permission
noise level. Curve names ending with o and u are for
over-assignments and under-assignments, respectively.
The curves for University u and Synthetic o are nearly
the same and overlap each other.
similarity would equal 1−ν. With our algorithm, the se-
mantic similarity is always significantly better than this.
The average semantic similarity is always 0.98 or higher,
even for ν = 0.12. The similarities are generally lower
for synthetic policies than sample policies, as expected,
because synthetic policies are not reconstructed as well
even in the absence of noise.
Permission Noise and Attribute Noise: To evaluate
the effectiveness of our noise detection techniques in
the presence of permission noise and attribute noise, we
performed experiments in which, for a given noise level
ν, we added ν|UP0|/7 under-assignments, 5ν|UP0|/7
over-assignments, and ν|UP0|/7 permission errors due
to attribute errors to the ACL policy generated from
the ABAC policy (in other words, we add attribute
errors until ν|UP0|/7 user-permission tuples have been
added or removed due to attribute errors; this way,
attribute errors are measured on the same scale as under-
assignments and over-assignments). The attribute errors
are divided equally between missing values (i.e., replace
a non-bottom value with bottom) and incorrect values
(i.e., replace a non-bottom value with another non-
bottom value). Our current techniques do not attempt to
distinguish permission noise from attribute noise (this is
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12
Se
m
an
tic
 S
im
ila
rit
y
Noise Level
Healthcare
ProjMgmt
University
Synthetic
Fig. 11. Semantic similarity of the original policy and the
mined policy, as a function of permission noise level.
a topic for future research); policy analysts are responsi-
ble for determining whether a reported suspected error
is due to an incorrect permission, an incorrect or missing
attribute value, or a false alarm. Since our techniques
report only suspected under-assignments and suspected
over-assignments, when comparing actual noise to re-
ported noise, permission changes due to attribute noise
(i.e., changes in the set of user-permission tuples that
satisfy the original policy rules) are included in the
actual noise. We started with the same policies as above.
Graphs of Jaccard similarity of actual and reported noise,
and syntactic similarity of original and mined policies,
appear in Section 16 in the Supplemental Material. The
results are similar to those without attribute noise, except
with slightly lower similarities for the same fraction
of permission errors. This shows that our approach to
noise detection remains appropriate in the presence of
combined attribute noise and permission noise.
5.5 Comparison with Inductive Logic Programming
We implemented a translation from ABAC policy min-
ing to Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) and applied
Progol [14], [15], a well-known ILP system developed
by Stephen Muggleton, to translations of our sample
policies and synthetic policies. Details of the translation
appear in Section 17 in the Supplemental Material. Pro-
gol mostly succeeds in reconstructing the policies for
university and project management, except it fails to
learn rules with conjuncts or operation sets containing
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multiple constants, instead producing multiple rules. In
addition, Progol fails to reconstruct two rules in the
health care sample policy. Due to Progol’s failure to
learn rules with conjuncts or operation sets containing
multiple constants, we generated a new set of 20 syn-
thetic policies with at most 1 constant per conjunct and
1 operation per rule. On these policies with Nrule = 5,
our algorithm achieves a compression factor of 1.92,
compared to 1.67 for Progol.
Progol is much slower than our algorithm. For the
university (with Ndept = 10), health care (with Nward =
20), and project management (with Ndept = 20) sample
policies, Progol is 302, 375, and 369 times slower than
our algorithm, respectively. For synthetic policies with
Nrule = 5, Progol is 2.74 times slower than our algorithm;
for synthetic policies with Nrule = 10, we stopped Progol
after several hours.
6 RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, the algorithm in this
paper is the first policy mining algorithm for any ABAC
framework. Existing algorithms for access control pol-
icy mining produce role-based policies; this includes
algorithms that use attribute data, e.g., [7], [16], [17].
Algorithms for mining meaningful RBAC policies from
ACLs and user attribute data [7], [17] attempt to produce
RBAC policies that are small (i.e., have low WSC) and
contain roles that are meaningful in the sense that the
role’s user membership is close to the meaning of some
user attribute expression. User names (i.e., values of
uid) are used in role membership definitions and hence
are not used in attribute expressions, so some sets of
users cannot be characterized exactly by a user attribute
expression. The resulting role-based policies are often
much larger than attribute-based policies, due to the lack
of parameterization; for example, they require separate
roles for each department in an organization, in cases
where a single rule suffices in an attribute-based policy.
Furthermore, algorithms for mining meaningful roles
does not consider resource attributes (or permission
attributes), constraints, or set relationships.
Xu and Stoller’s work on mining parameterized RBAC
(PRBAC) policies [18] is more closely related. Their
PRBAC framework supports a simple form of ABAC,
because users and permissions have attributes that are
implicit parameters of roles, the set of users assigned to
a role is specified by an expression over user attributes,
and the set of permissions granted to a role is speci-
fied by an expression over permission attributes. Our
work differs from theirs in both the policy framework
and the algorithm. Regarding the policy framework,
our ABAC framework supports a richer form of ABAC
than their PRBAC framework does. Most importantly,
our framework supports multi-valued (also called “set-
valued”) attributes and allows attributes to be compared
using set membership, subset, and equality; their PRBAC
framework does not support multi-valued attributes,
and it allows attributes to be compared using only
equality. Multi-valued attributes are very important in
real policies. Due to the lack of multi-valued attributes,
the sample policies in [18] contain artificial limitations,
e.g., a faculty teaches only one course, and a doctor
is a member of only one medical team. Our sample
policies are extensions of their case studies without
these limitations: a faculty may teach multiple courses, a
doctor may be a member of multiple medical teams, etc.
Our algorithm works in a different, and more efficient,
way than theirs. Our algorithm directly constructs rules
to include in the output. Their algorithm constructs a
large set of candidate roles and then determines which
roles to include in the output, possibly discarding many
candidates (more than 90% for their sample policies).
Ni et al. investigated the use of machine learning algo-
rithms for security policy mining [10]. Specifically, they
use supervised machine learning algorithms to learn
classifiers that associate permissions with roles, given as
input the permissions, the roles, attribute data for the
permissions, and (as training data) the role-permission
assignment. The resulting classifier—a support vector
machine (SVM)—can be used to automate assignment of
new permissions to roles. They also consider a similar
scenario in which a supervised machine learning algo-
rithm is used to learn classifiers that associate users with
roles, given as input the users, the roles, user attribute
data, and the user-role assignment. The resulting clas-
sifiers are analogous to attribute expressions, but there
are many differences between their work and ours. The
largest difference is that their approach needs to be given
the roles and the role-permission or user-role assignment
as training data; in contrast, our algorithm does not re-
quire any part of the desired high-level policy to be given
as input. Also, their work does not consider anything
analogous to constraints, but it could be extended to do
so. Exploring ABAC policy mining algorithms based on
machine learning is a direction for future work.
Lim et al. investigated the use of evolutionary al-
gorithms to learn and evolve security policies policies
[19]. They consider several problems, including difficult
problems related to risk-based policies, but not general
ABAC policy mining. In the facet of their work most
similar to ABAC policy mining, they showed that ge-
netic programming can learn the access condition in the
Bell-LaPadula multi-level security model for mandatory
access control. The learned predicate was sometimes
syntactically more complex than, but logically equivalent
to, the desired predicate.
Association rule mining has been studied extensively.
Seminal work includes Agrawal et al.’s algorithm for
mining propositional rules [20]. Association rule mining
algorithms are not well suited to ABAC policy mining,
because they are designed to find rules that are proba-
bilistic in nature [20] and are supported by statistically
strong evidence. They are not designed to produce a set
of rules that are strictly satisfied, that completely cover
the input data, and are minimum-sized among such sets
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of rules. Consequently, unlike our algorithm, they do not
give preference to smaller rules or rules with less overlap
(to reduce overall policy size).
Bauer et al. use association rule mining to detect policy
errors [21]. They apply propositional association rule
mining to access logs to learn rules expressing that a user
who exercised certain permissions is likely to exercise
another permission. A suspected misconfiguration exists
if a user who exercised the former permissions does not
have the latter permission. Bauer et al. do not consider
attribute data or generate entire policies.
Inductive logic programming (ILP) is a form of ma-
chine learning in which concepts are learned from ex-
amples and expressed as logic programs. ABAC poli-
cies can be represented as logic programs, so ABAC
policy mining can be seen as a special case of ILP.
However, ILP systems are not ideally suited to ABAC
policy mining. ILP is a more difficult problem, which
involves learning incompletely specified relations from
a limited number of positive and negative examples, ex-
ploiting background knowledge, etc. ILP algorithms are
correspondingly more complicated and less scalable, and
focus more on how much to generalize from the given
examples than on optimization of logic program size. For
example, Progol (cf. Section 5.5) uses a compression (rule
size) metric to guide construction of each rule but does
not attempt to achieve good compression for the learned
rules collectively; in particular, it does not perform steps
analogous to merging rules, eliminating overlap between
rules, and selecting the highest-quality candidate rules
for the final solution. As the experiments in Section 5.5
demonstrate, Progol is slower and generally produces
policies with higher WSC, compared to our algorithm.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper presents an ABAC policy mining algorithm.
Experiments with sample policies and synthetic policies
demonstrate the algorithm’s effectiveness. Directions for
future work include supporting additional ABAC policy
language features and exploring use of machine learning
for ABAC policy mining.
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8 PROOF OF NP-HARDNESS
This section shows that the ABAC policy mining prob-
lem is NP-hard, by reducing the Edge Role Mining
Problem (Edge RMP) [8] to it.
An RBAC policy is a tuple piRBAC = 〈U,P,R,UA,PA〉,
where R is a set of roles, UA ⊆ U × R is the user-
role assignment, and PA ⊆ R × P is role-permission
assignment. The number of edges in an RBAC policy
piRBAC with this form is |UA|+|PA|. The user-permission
assignment induced by an RBAC policy with the above
form is [[piRBAC]] = UA ◦ PA, where ◦ denotes relational
composition.
The Edge Role Mining Problem (Edge RMP) is [8]: Given
an ACL policy 〈U,P,UP〉, where U is a set of users, P is a
set of permissions, and UP ⊆ U×P is a user-permission
relation, find an RBAC policy piRBAC = 〈U,P,R,UA,PA〉
such that [[piRBAC]] = UP and piRBAC has minimum
number of edges among RBAC policies satisfying this
condition. NP-hardness of Edge RMP follows from The-
orem 1 in [7], since Edge RMP corresponds to the
Weighted Structural Complexity Optimization (WSCO)
Problem with wr = 0, wu = 1, wp = 1, wh = ∞, and
wd =∞.
Given an Edge RMP problem instance 〈U,P,UP〉,
consider the ABAC policy mining problem instance with
ACL policy pi0 = 〈U ∪{u0}, P ∪{r0}, {op0},UP0〉, where
u0 is a new user and r0 is a new resource, UP0 =
{〈u, r, op0〉 | 〈u, r〉 ∈ UP}, user attributes Au = {uid},
resource attributes Ar = {rid}, user attribute data du
defined by du(u,uid) = u, resource attribute data dr
defined by dr(r, rid) = r, and policy quality metric Qpol
defined by WSC with w1 = 1, w2 = 1, w3 = 0, and
w4 = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume U ∩P = ∅;
this should always hold, because in RBAC, users are
identified by names that are atomic values, and permis-
sions are resource-operation pairs; if for some reason this
assumption doesn’t hold, we can safely rename users or
permissions to satisfy this assumption, because RBAC
semantics is insensitive to equalities between users and
permissions.
A solution to the given Edge-RMP problem instance
can be constructed trivially from a solution piABAC to
the above ABAC policy mining instance by interpreting
each rule as a role. Note that rules in piABAC do not
contain any constraints, because uid and rid are the only
attributes, and U∩P = ∅ ensures that constraints relating
uid and rid are useless (consequently, any non-zero value
for w4 suffices). The presence of the “dummy” user u0
and “dummy” resource r0 ensure that the UAE and RAE
in every rule in piABAC contains a conjunct for uid or
rid, respectively, because no correct rule can apply to all
users or all resources. These observations, and the above
choice of weights, implies that the WSC of a rule ρ in
piRBAC equals the number of users that satisfy ρ plus
the number of resources (i.e., permissions) that satisfy ρ.
Thus, WSC(piRBAC) equals the number of edges in the
corresponding RBAC policy, and an ABAC policy with
minimum WSC corresponds to an RBAC policy with
minimum number of edges.
9 ASYMPTOTIC RUNNING TIME
This section analyzes the asymptotic running time of our
algorithm. We first analyze the main loop in Figure 1,
i.e., the while loop in lines 3–11. First consider the cost
of one iteration. The running time of candidateConstraint
in line 5 is O(|Au| × |Ar|). The running time of line 6 is
O(|Ur,o| × |Au| × |Ar|), where Ur,o = {u′ ∈ U | 〈u′, r, o〉 ∈
uncovUP}; this running time is achieved by incremen-
tally maintaining an auxiliary map that maps each pair
〈r, o〉 in R × Op to Ur,o. The running time of function
generalizeRule in line 4 in Figure 2 is O(|2|cc||). Other
steps in the main loop are either constant time or linear,
i.e., O(|Au| + |Ar| + |UP0|). Now consider the number
of iterations of the main loop. The number of iterations
is |Rules1|, where Rules1 is the set of rules generated
by the main loop. In the worst case, the rule generated
in each iteration covers one user-permission tuple, and
|Rules1| is as large as |UP0|. Typically, rules generalize to
cover many user-permission tuples, and |Rules1| is much
smaller than |UP0|.
The running time of function mergeRules is
O(|Rules1|3). The running time of function simplifyRules
is based on the running times of the five “elim” functions
that it calls. Let lcu,m (mnemonic for “largest conjunct”)
denote the maximum number of sets in a conjunct for
a multi-valued user attribute in the rules in Rules1, i.e.,
∀a ∈ Au,m.∀ρ ∈ Rules1. |uae(ρ)(a)| ≤ lcu,m. The value
of lcu,m is at most |Valm| but typically small (one or a
few). The running time of function elimRedundantSets
is O(|Au| × lc2u,m × |Vals|). Checking validity of a rule
ρ takes time linear in | [[ρ]] |. Let lm (mnemonic for
“largest meaning”) denote the maximum value of | [[ρ]] |
among all rules ρ passed as the first argument in a
call to elimConstraints, elimConjuncts, or elimElements.
The value of lm is at most |UP0| but typically much
smaller. The running time of function elimConstraints
is O((2|cc|) × lm). The running time of function
elimConjuncts is O((2|Au| + 2|Ar|)× lm). The exponential
factors in the running time of elimConstraints and
elimConjuncts are small in practice, as discussed
above; note that the factor of lm represents the cost
of checking validity of a rule. The running time
of elimElements is O(|Au| × lm). Let le (mnemonic
for “largest expressions”) denote the maximum of
WSC(uae(ρ)) + WSC(rae(ρ)) among rules ρ contained
in any set Rules passed as the first argument in a call
to simplifyRules. The running time of elimOverlapVal
is O(|Rules1| × (|Au| + |Ar|) × le). The running time of
elimOverlapOp is O(|Rules1|× |Op|× le). The factor le in
the running times of elimOverlapVal and elimOverlapOp
represents the cost of subset checking. The number of
iterations of the while loop in line 13–15 is |Rules1|
in the worst case. The overall running time of the
algorithm is worst-case cubic in |UP0|.
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10 PROCESSING ORDER
This section describes the order in which tuples and rules
are processed by our algorithm.
When selecting an element of uncovUP in line 4 of the
top-level pseudocode in Figure 1, the algorithm selects
the user-permission tuple with the highest (according to
lexicographic order) value for the following quality met-
ric Qup, which maps user-permission tuples to triples.
Informally, the first two components of Qup(〈u, r, o〉) are
the frequency of permission p and user u, respectively,
i.e., their numbers of occurrences in UP0, and the third
component is the string representation of 〈u, r, o〉 (a
deterministic although somewhat arbitrary tie-breaker
when the first two components of the metric are equal).
freq(〈r, o〉) = |{〈u′, r′, o′〉 ∈ UP0 | r′ = r ∧ o′ = o}|
freq(u) = |{〈u′, r′, o′〉 ∈ UP0 | u′ = u}|
Qup(〈u, r, o〉) = 〈freq(〈r, o〉), freq(u), toString(〈u, r, o〉)〉
In the iterations over Rules in mergeRules and
simplifyRules, the order in which rules are processed
is deterministic in our implementation, because Rules
is implemented as a linked list, loops iterate over the
rules in the order they appear in the list, and newly
generated rules are added at the beginning of the
list. In mergeRules, the workset is a priority queue
sorted in descending lexicographic order of rule pair
quality, where the quality of a rule pair 〈ρ1, ρ2〉 is
〈max(Qrul(ρ1), Qrul(ρ2)),min(Qrul(ρ1), Qrul(ρ2))〉.
11 OPTIMIZATIONS
Periodic Merging of Rules.: Our algorithm pro-
cesses UP0 in batches of 1000 tuples, and calls
mergeRules after processing each batch. Specifically, 1000
tuples are selected at random from uncovUP , they
are processed in the order described in Section 10,
mergeRules(Rules) is called, and then another batch of
tuples is processed.
This heuristic optimization is motivated by the obser-
vation that merging sometimes has the side-effect of gen-
eralization, i.e., the merged rule may cover more tuples
than the rules being merged. Merging earlier (compared
to waiting until uncovUP is empty) allows additional
tuples covered by merged rules to be removed from
uncovUP before those tuples are processed by the loop
over uncovUP in the top-level pseudocode in Figure 1.
Without this heuristic optimization, those tuples would
be processed by the loop over uncovUP , additional rules
would be generated from them, and those rules would
probably later get merged with other rules, leading to
the same policy.
Caching: To compute [[ρ]] for a rule ρ, our algorithm
first computes [[uae(ρ)]] and [[rae(ρ)]]. As an optimization,
our implementation caches [[ρ]], [[uae(ρ)]], and [[rae(ρ)]] for
each rule ρ. Each of these values is stored after the first
time it is computed. Subsequently, when one of these
values is needed, it is recomputed only if some compo-
nent of ρ, uae(ρ) or rae(ρ), respectively, has changed. In
our experiments, this optimization improves the running
time by a factor of approximately 8 to 10.
Early Stopping.: In the algorithm without noise de-
tection, in mergeRules, when checking validity of ρmerge,
our algorithm does not compute [[ρmerge]] completely
and then test [[ρmerge]] ⊆ UP0. Instead, as it computes
[[ρmerge]], it immediately checks whether each element is
in UP0, and if not, it does not bother to compute the rest
of [[ρmerge]]. In the algorithm with noise detection, that
validity test is replaced with the test | [[ρmerge]] \ UP0| ÷
| [[ρmerge]] | ≤ α. We incrementally compute the ratio on
the left while computing [[ρmerge]], and if the ratio exceeds
2α, we stop computing [[ρmerge]], under the assumption
that ρmerge would probably fail the test if we continued.
This heuristic decreases the running time significantly. It
can affect the result, but it had no effect on the result for
the problem instances on which we evaluated it.
12 DETAILS OF SAMPLE POLICIES
The figures in this section contain all rules and some
illustrative attribute data for each sample policy. This
section also describes in more detail the manually writ-
ten attribute datasets and synthetic attribute datasets for
the sample policies.
The policies are written in a concrete syntax with
the following kinds of statements. userAttrib(uid , a1 =
v1, a2 = v2, . . .) provides user attribute data for a user
whose “uid” attribute equals uid and whose attributes
a1, a2, . . . equal v1, v2, . . ., respectively. The resourceAt-
trib statement is similar. The statement rule(uae; pae;
ops; con) defines a rule; the four components of this
statement correspond directly to the four components of
a rule as defined in Section 2. In the attribute expressions
and constraints, conjuncts are separated by commas.
In constraints, the superset relation “⊇” is denoted by
“>”, the contains relation “3” is denoted by “]”, and
the superset-of-an-element-of relation ⊇∈ is denoted by
“supseteqIn”.
University Sample Policy: In our university sam-
ple policy, user attributes include position (applicant,
student, faculty, or staff), department (the user’s de-
partment), crsTaken (set of courses taken by a student),
crsTaught (set of courses for which the user is the
instructor (if the user is a faculty) or the TA (if the user
is a student), and isChair (true if the user is the chair
of his/her department). Resource attributes include type
(application, gradebook, roster, or transcript), crs (the
course a gradebook or roster is for, for those resource
types), student (the student whose transcript or appli-
cation this is, for type=transcript or type=application),
and department (the department the course is in, for
type ∈ {gradebook, roster}; the student’s major depart-
ment, for type=transcript). The policy rules and illus-
trative userAttrib and resourceAttrib statements appear
in Figure 12. The constraint “crsTaken ] crs” in the first
rule for gradebooks ensures that a user can apply the
readMyScores operation only to gradebooks for courses
17
the student has taken. This is not essential, but it is
natural and is advisable according to the defense-in-
depth principle.
The manually written attribute dataset for this sample
policy contains a few instances of each type of user and
resource: two academic departments, a few faculty, a
few gradebooks, several students, a few staff in each of
two administrative departments (admissions office and
registrar), etc. We generated a series of synthetic attribute
datasets, parameterized by the number of academic de-
partments. The generated userAttrib and resourceAttrib
statements for the users and resources associated with
each department are similar to but more numerous
than the userAttrib and resourceAttrib statements in
the manually written dataset. For each department, a
scaling factor called the department size is selected from a
normal distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation
1, truncated at 0.5 and 5 (allowing a 10-to-1 ratio between
the sizes of the largest and smallest departments). The
numbers of applicants, students, faculty, and courses
associated with a department equal the department
size times napp, nstu, nfac, and ncrs, respectively, where
napp = 5, nstu = 20, nfac = 5, ncrs = 10. The numbers of
courses taught by faculty, taken by students, and TAd
by students are selected from categorical distributions
with approximately normally distributed probabilities.
The courses taught by faulty are selected uniformly. The
courses taken and TAd by students are selected follow-
ing a Zipf distributions, to reflect the varying popularity
of courses. The number of staff in each administrative
department is proportional to the number of academic
departments.
Health Care Sample Policy: In our health care
sample policy, user attributes include position (doctor or
nurse; for other users, this attribute equals ⊥), specialties
(the medical areas that a doctor specializes in), teams
(the medical teams a doctor is a member of), ward (the
ward a nurse works in or a patient is being treated
in), and agentFor (the patients for which a user is an
agent). Resource attributes include type (HR for a health
record, or HRitem for a health record item), patient (the
patient that the HR or HR item is for), treatingTeam
(the medical team treating the aforementioned patient),
ward (the ward in which the aforementioned patient
is being treated), author (author of the HR item, for
type=HRitem), and topics (medical areas to which the
HR item is relevant, for type=HRitem). The policy rules
and illustrative userAttrib and resourceAttrib statements
appear in Figure 13.
The manually written attribute dataset for this sample
policy contains a small number of instances of each type
of user and resource: a few nurses, doctors, patients, and
agents, two wards, and a few items in each patient’s
health record. We generated a series of synthetic at-
tribute datasets, parameterized by the number of wards.
The generated userAttrib and resourceAttrib statements
for the users and resources associated with each ward
are similar to but more numerous than the userAttrib
// Rules for Gradebooks
// A user can read his/her own scores in gradebooks
// for courses he/she has taken.
rule(; type=gradebook; readMyScores; crsTaken ] crs)
// A user (the instructor or TA) can add scores and
// read scores in the gradebook for courses he/she
// is teaching.
rule(; type=gradebook; {addScore, readScore};
crsTaught ] crs;)
// The instructor for a course (i.e., a faculty teaching
// the course) can change scores and assign grades in
// the gradebook for that course.
rule(position=faculty; type=gradebook;
{changeScore, assignGrade}; crsTaught ] crs)
// Rules for Rosters
// A user in registrar’s office can read and modify all
// rosters.
rule(department=registrar; type=roster; {read, write}; )
// The instructor for a course (i.e., a faculty teaching
// the course) can read the course roster.
rule(position=faculty; type=roster; {read};
crsTaught ] crs)
// Rules for Transcripts
// A user can read his/her own transcript.
rule(; type=transcript; {read}; uid=student)
// The chair of a department can read the transcripts
// of all students in that department.
rule(isChair=true; type=transcript; {read};
department=department)
// A user in the registrar’s office can read every
// student’s transcript.
rule(department=registrar; type=transcript; {read}; )
// Rules for Applications for Admission
// A user can check the status of his/her own application.
rule(; type=application; {checkStatus}; uid=student)
// A user in the admissions office can read, and
// update the status of, every application.
rule(department=admissions; type=application;
{read, setStatus}; )
// An illustrative user attribute statement.
userAttrib(csFac2, position=faculty, department=cs,
crsTaught={cs601})
// An illustrative resource attribute statement.
resourceAttrib(cs601gradebook, department=cs,
crs=cs601, type=gradebook)
Fig. 12. University sample policy.
and resourceAttrib statements in the manually written
dataset. For each ward, a scaling factor called the ward
size is selected from a normal distribution with the
same parameters as the department size distribution
18
described above. The numbers of patients, nurses, doc-
tors, agents, and teams associated with a ward equal
the ward size times npat, nnurse, ndoc, nag, and nteam,
respectively, where npat = 10, ndoc = 2, nnurse = 4,
nag = 2, and nteam = 2. The numbers of items in each
patient’s medical record, the topics associated with each
HR item, patients associated with each agent, specialties
per doctor, and teams each doctor is on are selected
from categorical distributions with approximately nor-
mally distributed probabilities. The topics and specialties
associated with HR items and doctors, respectively, are
selected following a Zipf distribution.
Project Management Sample Policy: In our project
management sample policy, user attributes include
projects (projects the user is working on), projectsLed
(projects led by the user), adminRoles (the user’s admin-
istrative roles, e.g., accountant, auditor, planner, man-
ager), expertise (the user’s areas of technical expertise,
e.g., design, coding), tasks (tasks assigned to the user),
department (department that the user is in), and isEm-
ployee (true if the user is an employee, false if the user
is a contractor). Resource attributes include type (task,
schedule, or budget), project (project that the task, sched-
ule, or budget is for), department (department that the
aforementioned project is in), expertise (areas of techni-
cal expertise required to work on the task, for type=task)
and proprietary (true if the task involves proprietary
information, which is accessible only to employees, not
contractors). The policy rules and illustrative userAttrib
and resourceAttrib statements appear in Figure 14.
The manually written attribute dataset for this sample
policy contains a small number of instances of each type
of user (managers, accountants, coders, non-employees
(e.g,, contractors) and employees with various areas of
expertise, etc.) and each type of resource (two depart-
ments, two projects per department, three tasks per
project, etc.). We generated a series of synthetic attribute
datasets, parameterized by the number of departments.
The generated userAttrib and resourceAttrib statements
for the users and resources associated with each de-
partment are similar to but more numerous than the
userAttrib and resourceAttrib statements in the man-
ually written dataset. For each department, a scaling
factor called the department size is selected from a nor-
mal distribution with the same parameters as for the
university sample policy. The numbers of projects, non-
employees per area of expertise, and employees per
area of expertise that are associated with a department
equal the department size times nproj, nnonEmp, and nemp,
respectively, where nproj = 2, nnonEmp = 1, and nemp = 1.
Each department has one manager, accountant, auditor,
and planner, and one project leader per project. Six tasks
are associated with each project. The projects assigned to
non-employees and employees are selected following a
Zipf distribution.
// Rules for Health Records
// A nurse can add an item in a HR for a patient in
// the ward in which he/she works.
rule(position=nurse; type=HR; {addItem}; ward=ward)
// A user can add an item in a HR for a patient treated
// by one of the teams of which he/she is a member.
rule(; type=HR; {addItem}; teams ] treatingTeam)
// A user can add an item with topic ”note” in his/her
// own HR.
rule(; type=HR; {addNote}; uid=patient)
// A user can add an item with topic ”note” in the HR
// of a patient for which he/she is an agent.
rule(; type=HR; {addNote}; agentFor ] patient)
// Rules for Health Record Items
// The author of an item can read it.
rule(; type=HRitem; {read}; uid=author)
// A nurse can read an item with topic ”nursing” in a HR
// for a patient in the ward in which he/she works.
rule(position=nurse; type=HRitem,
topics supseteqIn {{nursing}}; {read}; ward=ward)
// A user can read an item in a HR for a patient treated
// by one of the teams of which he/she is a member, if
// the topics of the item are among his/her specialties.
rule(; type=HRitem; {read}; specialties > topics,
teams ] treatingTeam)
// A user can read an item with topic ”note” in his/her
// own HR.
rule(; type=HRitem, topics supseteqIn {{note}}; {read};
uid=patient)
// An agent can read an item with topic ”note” in the
// HR of a patient for which he/she is an agent.
rule(; type=HRitem, topics supseteqIn {{note}}; {read};
agentFor ] patient)
// An illustrative user attribute statement.
userAttrib(oncDoc1, position=doctor,
specialties={oncology},
teams={oncTeam1, oncTeam2})
// An illustrative resource attribute statement.
resourceAttrib(oncPat1nursingItem, type=HRitem,
author=oncNurse2, patient=oncPat1,
topics={nursing}, ward=oncWard,
treatingTeam=oncTeam1)
Fig. 13. Health care sample policy.
13 EXAMPLE: PROCESSING OF A USER-
PERMISSION TUPLE
Figure 15 illustrates the processing of the user-
permission tuple t = 〈csFac2, addScore, cs601gradebook〉
selected as a seed (i.e., selected in line 4 of Figure 1),
in a smaller version of the university sample policy
containing only one rule, namely, the second rule in
Figure 12. Attribute data for user csFac2 and resource
cs601gradebook appear in Figure 12.
The edge from t to cc labeled “candidateConstraint”
represents the call to candidateConstraint, which re-
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mergeRules 
position  {faculty, studuent} 
type  {gradebook} 
{addScore} 
dept = dept, crsTaught    crs 
position  {faculty} 
type  {gradebook} 
{readScore, addScore} 
dept = dept, crsTaught    crs 
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Fig. 15. Diagram representing the processing of one user-permission tuple selected as a seed, in the university
sample policy. Rules are depicted as rectangles with four compartments, corresponding to the four components of a
rule tuple.
turns the set of atomic constraints that hold be-
tween csFac2 and cs601gradebook; these constraints
are shown in the box labeled cc. The two boxes la-
beled “addCandidateRule” represent the two calls to
addCandidateRule. Internal details are shown for the first
call but elided for the second call. The edges from t to eu
and from t to er represent the calls in addCandidateRule
to computeUAE and computeRAE, respectively. The call
to computeUAE returns a user-attribute expression eu
that characterizes the set su containing users u′ with
permission 〈addScore, cs601gradebook〉 and such that
candidateConstraint(cs601gradebook, u′) = cc. The call to
computeRAE returns a resource-attribute expression that
characterizes {cs601gradebook}. The set of operations
considered in this call to addCandidateRule is simply
so = {addScore}. The call to generalizeRule generates
a candidate rule ρ1 by assigning eu, er and so to the
first three components of ρ1, and adding the two atomic
constraints in cc to ρ1 and eliminating the conjuncts in eu
and er corresponding to the attributes mentioned in cc.
Similarly, the second call to addCandidateRule generates
another candidate rule ρ2. The call to mergeRules merges
ρ1 and ρ2 to form ρ3, which is simplified by the call to
simplifyRules to produce a simplified rule ρ4, which is
added to candidate rule set Rules ′.
14 SYNTACTIC SIMILARITY
Syntactic similarity of policies measures the syntactic
similarity of rules in the policies. The syntactic similarity
of rules ρ and ρ′, denoted ss(ρ, ρ′), is defined by
ssu(e, e
′) = |Au|−1
∑
a∈Au
J(e(a), e′(a))
ssr(e, e
′) = |Ar|−1
∑
a∈Ar
J(e(a), e′(a))
ss(ρ, ρ′) = mean(ssu(uae(ρ),uae(ρ′)), ssr(rae(ρ), rae(ρ′)),
J(ops(ρ), ops(ρ′)), J(con(ρ), con(ρ′)))
where the Jaccard similarity of two sets is J(S1, S2) =
|S1 ∩ S2|/|S1 ∪ S2|.
The syntactic similarity of rule sets Rules and Rules ′
is the average, over rules ρ in Rules , of the syntactic
similarity between ρ and the most similar rule in Rules ′.
The syntactic similarity of policies is the maximum of the
syntactic similarity of the sets of rules in the policies,
considered in both orders (this makes the relation sym-
metric).
ss(Rules,Rules ′) = |Rules|−1 ×∑
ρ∈Rules max({ss(ρ, ρ′) | ρ′ ∈ Rules ′}))
ss(pi, pi′) = max(ss(rules(pi), rules(pi′)),
ss(rules(pi′), rules(pi)))
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// The manager of a department can read and approve
// the budget for a project in the department.
rule(adminRoles supseteqIn {{manager}}; type=budget;
{read approve}; department=department)
// A project leader can read and write the project
// schedule and budget.
rule( ; type in {schedule, budget}; {read, write};
projectsLed ] project)
// A user working on a project can read the project
// schedule.
rule( ; type=schedule; {read}; projects ] project)
// A user can update the status of tasks assigned to
// him/her.
rule( ; type=task; {setStatus}; tasks ] rid)
// A user working on a project can read and request
// to work on a non-proprietary task whose required
// areas of expertise are among his/her areas of
// expertise.
rule( ; type=task, proprietary=false; {read request};
projects ] project, expertise > expertise)
// An employee working on a project can read and
// request to work on any task whose required areas
// of expertise are among his/her areas of expertise.
rule(isEmployee=True; type=task; {read request};
projects ] project, expertise > expertise)
// An auditor assigned to a project can read the
// budget.
rule(adminRoles supseteqIn {{auditor}}; type=budget;
{read}; projects ] project)
// An accountant assigned to a project can read and
// write the budget.
rule(adminRoles supseteqIn {{accountant}};
type=budget; {read, write}; projects ] project)
// An accountant assigned to a project can update the
// cost of tasks.
rule(adminRoles supseteqIn {{accountant}}; type=task;
{setCost}; projects ] project)
// A planner assigned to a project can update the
// schedule.
rule(adminRoles supseteqIn {{planner}};
type=schedule; {write}; projects ] project)
// A planner assigned to a project can update the
// schedule (e.g., start date, end date) of tasks.
rule(adminRoles supseteqIn {{planner}}; type=task;
{setSchedule}; projects ] project)
// An illustrative user attribute statement.
userAttrib(des11, expertise={design}, projects={proj11},
isEmployee=True,
tasks={proj11task1a, proj11task1propa})
// An illustrative resource attribute statement.
resourceAttrib(proj11task1a, type=task, project=proj11,
department=dept1, expertise={design},
proprietary=false)
Fig. 14. Project management sample policy.
15 ROC CURVES FOR NOISE DETECTION PA-
RAMETERS
When tuning the parameters α and τ used in noise
detection (see Section 4.1), there is a trade-off between
true positives and false positives. To illustrate the trade-
off, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
in Figure 16 shows the dependence of the true posi-
tive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) for under-
assignments on α and τ for synthetic policies with 20
rules and 6% noise, split between under-assignments
and over-assignments as described in Section 5.4. Fig-
ure 17 shows the TPR and FPR for over-assignments.
Each data point is an average over 10 synthetic poli-
cies. In each of these two sets of experiments, true
positives are reported noise (of the specified type, i.e.,
over-assignments or under-assignments) or that are also
actual noise; false negatives are actual noise that are
not reported; false positives are reported noise that are
not actual noise; and true negatives are user-permission
tuples that are not actual noise and are not reported as
noise.
Generally, we can see from the ROC curves that, with
appropriate parameter values, it is possible to achieve
very high TPR and FPR simultaneously, so there is not
a significant inherent trade-off between them.
From the ROC curve for under-assignments, we see
that the value of τ does not affect computation of under-
assignments, as expected, because detection of under-
assignments is performed before detection of over-
assignments (the former is done when each rule is
generated, and the latter is done at the end). We see
from the diagonal portion of the curve in the upper left
that, when choosing the value of α, there is a trade-
off between the TPR and FPR, i.e., having a few false
negatives and a few false positives.
From the ROC curve for over-assignments, we see
that the value of α affects the rules that are generated,
and hence it affects the computation of over-assignments
based on those rules at the end of the rule generation
process. For α = 0.01, when choosing τ , there is some
trade-off between the TPR and FPR. For α ≥ 0.02, the
FPR equals 0 independent of τ , so there is no trade-off:
the best values of τ are the ones with the highest TPR.
16 GRAPHS OF RESULTS FROM EXPERI-
MENTS WITH PERMISSION NOISE AND AT-
TRIBUTE NOISE
For the experiments with permission noise and at-
tribute noise described in Section 5.4, Figure 18 shows
the Jaccard similarity of the actual and reported over-
assignments and the Jaccard similarity of the actual and
reported under-assignments, and Figure 19 shows the
semantic similarity of the original and mined policies.
Each data point is an average over 10 policies. Error
bars show 95% confidence intervals using Student’s t-
distribution.
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17 TRANSLATION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC PRO-
GRAMMING
This section describes our translation from the ABAC
policy mining problem to inductive logic programming
(ILP) as embodied in Progol [14], [15]. Given an ACL
policy and attribute data, we generate a Progol input
file, which contains type definitions, mode declarations,
background knowledge, and examples.
Type Declarations: Type definitions define
categories of objects. The types user, resource,
operation, and attribValAtomic (corresponding
to Vals) are defined by a statement for each constant
of that type; for example, for each user u, we generate
the statement user(u). The type attribValSet
(corresponding to Valm) is defined by the rules
attribValSet([]).
attribValSet([V|Vs]) :- attribValAtomic(V),
attribValSet(Vs).
For each attribute a, we define a type containing the
constants that appear in values of that attribute in
the attribute data; for example, for each value d of
the “department” attribute, we generate the statement
departmentType(d).
Mode Declarations: Mode declarations restrict the
form of rules that Progol considers, by limiting how each
predicate may be used in learned rules. Each head mode
declaration modeh(. . .) describes a way in which a pred-
icate may be used in the head (conclusion) of a learned
rule. Each body mode declaration modeb(. . .) describes
a way in which a predicate may be used in the body
(premises) of a learned rule. Each mode declaration has
two arguments. The second argument specifies, for each
argument a of the predicate, the type of a and whether a
may be instantiated with an input variable (indicated by
“+”), an output variable (indicated by “-”), or a constant
(indicated by “#”). The first argument, called the recall,
is an integer or *, which bounds the number of values of
the output arguments for which the predicate can hold
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for given values of the input arguments and constant
arguments; “*” indicates no bound. The specification of
predicate arguments as inputs and outputs also limits
how variables may appear in learned rules. In a learned
rule h :- b1, . . . , bn, every variable of input type in each
premise bi must appear either with input type in h or
with output type in some premise bj with j < i.
We generate only one head mode declaration:
modeh(1, up(+user, +resource, #operation))
This tells Progol to learn rules that define the user-
permission predicate up.
For each single-valued user attribute a, we gener-
ate a body mode declaration modeb(1, aU(+user,
#aType)). For example, the mode declaration for
a user attribute named “department” is modeb(1,
departmentU(+user, #departmentType)). We ap-
pend “U” to the attribute name to prevent naming
conflicts in case there is a resource attribute with the
same name. Mode declarations for multi-valued user
attributes are defined similarly, except with “*” instead
of 1 as the recall. Mode declarations for resource at-
tributes are defined similarly, except with R instead of
U appended to the attribute name. We tried a variant
translation in which we generated a second body mode
declaration for each attribute, using -aType instead of
#aType, but this led to worse results.
We also generate mode declarations for predi-
cates used to express constraints. For each single-
valued user attribute a and single-valued resource at-
tribute a¯, we generate a mode declaration modeb(1,
aU_equals_a¯R(+user,+resource)); the predicate
aU equals a¯R is used to express atomic constraints of
the form a = a¯. The mode declarations for the predicates
used to express the other two forms of atomic constraints
are similar, using user and resource attributes with ap-
propriate cardinality, and with “contains” (for 3) or
“superset” (for ⊇) instead of “equals” in the name
of the predicate.
Background Knowledge: The attribute data is ex-
pressed as background knowledge. For each user u
and each single-valued user attribute a, we generate a
statement aU(u, v) where v = du(u, a). For each user u
and each multi-valued user attribute a, we generate a
statement aU(u, v) for each v ∈ du(u, a). Background
knowledge statements for resource attribute data are
defined similarly.
Definitions of the predicates used to express con-
straints are also included in the background knowl-
edge. For each equality predicate a equals a¯ men-
tioned in the mode declarations, we generate a state-
ment aU_equals_a¯R(U,R) :- aU(U,X), a¯R(R,X).
The definitions of the predicates used to express the
other two forms of constraints are
aU_contains_a¯R(U,R) :- aU(U,X), a¯R(R,X).
aU_superset_a¯R(U,R) :- setof(X, aU(U,X),SU),
setof(Y, a¯R(R,Y),SR),
superset(SU,SR),
not(SR==[]).
superset(Y,[A|X]) :- element(A,Y),
superset(Y,X).
superset(Y,[]).
The premise not(SR==[]) in the definition of
aU_superset_a¯R is needed to handle cases where the
value of a¯ is ⊥. The predicates setof and element are
built-in predicates in Progol.
Examples: A positive example is an instantiation of a
predicate to be learned for which the predicate holds. A
negative example is an instantiation of a predicate to be
learned for which the predicate does not hold. For each
〈u, r, o〉 ∈ U×R×Op, if 〈u, r, o〉 ∈ UP0, then we generate
a positive example up(u, r, o), otherwise we generate
a negative example :- up(u, r, o) (the leading “:-”
indicates that the example is negative). The negative
examples are necessary because, without them, Progol
may produce rules that hold for instantiations of up not
mentioned in the positive examples.
